Taylorism Versus Welfare Work in American Industry: H. L. Gantt and the Bancrofts

Two differing managerial philosophies competed for the support of American businessmen around the beginning of the twentieth century—the "scientific management" of Frederick W. Taylor and a general set of practices known as "welfare work." This study examines the experience of a Brandywine River textile firm which tried to employ both approaches at the same time.

In their search for new ways to "reconcile" the distended firm, late nineteenth century businessmen and engineers inspired the "management movement," a series of loosely related attempts to bring system and order to business administration. Perhaps the best example of the divergent, fragmented character of these efforts was the rivalry between Taylorism and welfare work, two aspects of the "movement" that attracted considerable attention from managers interested in personnel and production problems. Despite common goals, Taylorism and welfare work developed independently, attracted separate followers, and followed parallel, often competitive courses for more than a decade. The similarities, differences, and reasons for the antagonism between the rival doctrines can be seen in the experiences of the Joseph Bancroft & Sons Company of Wilmington, Delaware, the first firm to introduce both Taylorism and welfare work during the same period. 2


2 The Santa Fe Railroad hired Harrington Emerson in 1903 to systematize its repair
Taylorism was an outgrowth of the "works management" movement and the pioneering work of Frederick W. Taylor at the Midvale and Bethlehem Steel Companies in the 1880's and 1890's. Its basic premise was that "human activity could be measured, analyzed, and controlled by techniques analogous to those that had proved successful when applied to physical objects." In practical terms, it combined a variety of new and old ideas, the most notable of which were time study and the incentive wage. In fact, Taylor's relative obscurity before the publication of "Shop Management" in 1903 was in large part due to the widespread belief that his earlier paper, "A Piece-Rate System," merely described another plan to make piece work operate as it was intended. Readers of "Shop Management" were therefore surprised to learn that Taylor's system demanded a thorough reorganization of the shop, new roles for managers and workers alike, and, most ominously, a "mental revolution." Equally ambitious were the promised results: greater output, lowered costs, higher wages, and labor-management harmony.

Of the men who applied this doctrine after Taylor's retirement in 1902, Henry Laurence Gantt was perhaps the most notable. An engineer trained at Johns Hopkins and at Stevens Institute of Technology, he had worked with Taylor at Midvale Steel, Simonds Rolling Machine, and Bethlehem Steel. By 1908, when he introduced Tylorism at the Bankcroft Company, Gantt was probably the most experienced practitioner of the new "science," and next to Taylor himself, the best-known member of the Taylor circle.5

Welfare work was also a response to the businessman's demand for a more systematic approach to labor problems. Although it had existed in some form since the time of Robert Owen, its late-nine-
teenth century version grew out of the activities of a few paternalistic employers and humanitarian reformers. It was promoted at first by organizations such as William Tolman's League for Social Service, but it attracted an important sponsoring group only after the National Civic Federation (NCF) formed a welfare department in 1904. Unlike Taylorism, which encompassed a definite set of practices, welfare work could include any number of programs. The NCF tried to be more specific: "welfare work involves special consideration for physical comfort wherever labor is performed; opportunities for recreation; educational advantages; and the providing of suitable sanitary homes . . . plans for saving and lending money, and provisions for insurance and pensions."*

The purposes of this activity were equally diverse. Employers usually stressed their philanthropic or paternalistic motives, but also their desires to secure a stable labor force, "decrease the floating element," promote harmonious relations and worker loyalty, combat unionism, and insure against strikes. A careful reading of employers' statements indicates that the latter economic goals (discouraging unions and avoiding strikes) were nearly always important, if not paramount. The activities of John Patterson, president and principal owner of the National Cash Register Company, are suggestive. The autocratic Patterson, whose program was among the first and most ambitious, introduced welfare work in the mid-1890's and, despite occasional reverses, continued it until his death in the 1920's. In an influential article published at the turn of the century, he emphasized that welfare work reduced production costs and increased profits. Patterson adopted the slogan "it pays" and

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maintained that he could calculate the profits on his welfare expenditures. Other employers, influenced by this example, sponsored welfare work for their own as well as their employees' benefit. Thus, welfare work, like Taylorism, aimed at reducing costs and conflict by improving the workers' performance.

Despite this similarity of objectives, there was no effort to combine the two movements before World War I. The most obvious reason for this was that Taylorism and welfare work, as responses of individual managers to specific problems, developed in different economic settings. Systematic "works management" had made its greatest inroads in the machinery industry, and Taylor's experience and that of his early disciples was largely in this field. Welfare work, on the other hand, was usually introduced in department stores, textile mills, mines, and - after Taylor's time - steel mills. Welfare work, therefore, was usually found in firms that either employed large numbers of women or were geographically isolated. The large stores and southern textile mills probably employed more welfare workers and sponsored more benefit programs than companies in all other industries together before 1910.

Far more important were the attitudes and values of the leaders of both groups. Taylor was first of all an engineer, and his technical outlook apparently accounted for his simplistic view of human nature, particularly his beliefs that workmen desired only higher wages and that other benefits were demeaning and unmanly.

10 See O. M. Becker, "The Square Deal in Works Management, I," Eng. Mag., XXX (January, 1906), 553. Other employers were more careful. "It is surprising to find that few firms have definite knowledge of what the work is costing them." See "Welfare Work," BLS Bull., 250 (1919), 118.
11 Taylor worked entirely within the plant; the welfare "secretaries" devoted much of their time to "outside" activities such as community housing and health work. However, as Gertrude Reeks (Secretary of the National Civic Federation's Welfare Department) wrote, factory ventilation and sanitation were "primary." "They are literally the first letters of the alphabet of welfare work." Gertrude Reeks, "What is Welfare Work?" National Civic Federation Monthly Review (hereafter NCW, Mo. R.), 1 (August, 1904), 4.
12 While Taylor's most famous jobs were with iron and steel companies, his work was largely confined to their machine shops. No definitive list of firms advised by Taylor, his followers or imitators can be compiled. For two contemporary guesses at the scope of Taylorism and other "efficiency" systems, see "The Present State of the Art of Industrial Management," ASME Trans., XXXIV (1913), 1156; and C. B. Thompson, The Theory and Practice of Scientific Management (New York: 1917), 37-45.
13 The original officers of the National Civic Federation's Welfare Department included twenty-seven prominent employers, nineteen of whom employed large numbers of women or operated in isolated areas. "How the Welfare Department was Organized," NCW, Mo. R., 1 (June, 1904), 14. One hundred seven of the 431 establishments studied by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1919 were textile factories or stores. "Welfare Work," BLS Bull., 250 (1919).
14 C. Bertrand Thompson, one of the earliest analysts of the movement, wrote of Taylor: "While on the whole he understood very well the psychology of the workingman . . . he did not grasp sympathetically the aspiration towards industrial democracy, nor could he see the point of the current contention that it does not follow necessarily, from the fact that a man can do a certain thing in a certain time, that therefore he ought to do it in that time." Thompson, Theory and Practice, 38-29.
His followers, also engineers, accepted this view together with the rest of his doctrine. It is not surprising, then, that they had little use for welfare work or its proponents. In “Shop Management,” Taylor noted a recent strike at NCR and suggested that “semi-philanthropic schemes should follow instead of preceding the solution of the wages question.” He told Frank B. Copley, his official biographer, that welfare work was “a joke.” Gaunt was hardly more tactful when he explained to Edith Wyatt, a social worker preparing a book on scientific management, that Taylor and his associates were interested in the workers’ welfare “not only as a matter of sentiment, but as a matter of business, just as a man objects to having a horse abused for he becomes less efficient.” “I tried to tell her,” he later explained, “that we were not doing welfare work but what we considered good business—which when looked at in the proper light—was better and more permanent than welfare work.”

Proponents of welfare work were somewhat less certain of their own role and of the contributions of Taylorism. Since welfare work might encompass much or little depending on the individual employer’s interests, it was difficult to be very specific in evaluating it. Advocates tended to speak in vague, optimistic terms and to exaggerate their achievements. Since most “welfare secretaries,” the men and women who were hired to implement welfare programs, frequently had backgrounds in religious or humanitarian work and had little first-hand exposure to industrial problems, this was perhaps natural. Despite these difficulties, they agreed that industrial life was dehumanizing and that anything which might...

21 Quoted in Frank B. Copley, “Frederick W. Taylor, Revolutionary,” The Outlook, 111 (September 1, 1915), 42. Most engineers of the period, whatever their opinion of Taylor, probably shared his belief that welfare work was irrelevant or contemptible, or both. F. A. Halsey, originator of the “premium” system of wage payment, publicly attacked Patterson. See American Machinist, XXIV (June 20, 1901), 688-689; also Haber, Efficiency and Uplift, ch. 2.
further subordinate the employee to the exigencies of production (such as Taylorism) required careful scrutiny.\(^{29}\)

By 1908, then, both doctrines had experienced and articulate defenders who knew or cared little about the other position. Under these circumstances, employers interested in managerial reform selected one approach or the other. There was, however, one exception. In February of that year, for various reasons and probably without considering the potential difficulties, John Bancroft, superintendent of the Bancroft mills, member of the NCF and promoter of welfare work, engaged Gantt to help him solve certain "labor problems."

**Welfare Work at the Bancroft Company**

In 1908 the Bancroft Company had manufactured cotton cloth at its site at Rockland, on the Brandywine River, for seventy-seven years. For most of that period it had grown slowly and changed little. The plant, "an enormous picturesque cement [sic] pile reaching like a bastion along the Brandywine ... with its windows overlooking the wooded bank of the stream," operated much as it had since the middle of the nineteenth century except for dyeing and finishing departments that were added in the 1890's.\(^{21}\) When Joseph Bancroft, the founder, died in 1874, his sons, William and Samuel, became president and vice-president as well as the principal partners and, after 1889, the dominant stockholders. The company remained nominally under their control, although it was John Bancroft, William's cousin and the plant superintendent, who actually ran it after the mid-1890's. Like his cousins and the other family stockholders, John was exceedingly conservative. But the Bancrofts' reverence for tradition occasionally led them in new directions. As Gantt was to discover, such a mixture of the old and new required unusual delicacy to be handled successfully.

Joseph Bancroft had been a devout Quaker who took his religious commitments as seriously as his business responsibilities. His concern for his employees, plus the fact that the plant was too far from Wilmington for mass commuting, led the company to assume important community obligations. Houses, a school, and other conveniences were provided for the workers. In the 1890's a trade journal reported that the company rented over one hundred houses

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\(^{29}\) See, for example, Josephine Goldmark, *Fatigue and Efficiency* (New York, 1912), ch. 7.

\(^{21}\) Sue Arierle Clark and Edith Wyatt, *Making Both Ends Meet* (New York, 1911), 261.
the managers of much of the day-to-day responsibility for administering the company housing and other community services.

John Bancroft signaled the new era in Bancroft management when he hired Miss Elizabeth Briscoe, the teacher in the Bancroft school since 1879, to serve as "welfare secretary." Miss Briscoe later confessed that "when I began my work ... we had no definite plans." But the Bancrofts soon defined her job as "interpreting the position of the employer toward the employees," and acting as "the representative of the employees, bringing before the firm any grievances that affect the employees individually or collectively." In practice her activities ran the gamut of Bancroft personnel and industrial relations functions, from administering major benefit programs, operating the dining room, and evicting wayward employees from the company houses, to seeing that labor unions gained no foothold in the Bancroft mills.

Having delegated authority for the administration of their programs, the Bancrofts turned their attention to specific problems. Their first concern was to accommodate the plant to the larger labor force. In July 1902, the Board of Directors appropriated $1,200 for fire escapes and $800 for safety gates on elevators. Soon the company added a sprinkler system, improved the ventilation, and installed a device to filter the drinking water. Delaware law required a dining room, rest rooms, and at least one sink per fifteen female employees, but by 1907 the Bancrofts had exceeded this minimum for women and had added similar facilities for the men. Miss Briscoe wrote in November 1907 that "closets, wash basins, lockers, dressing rooms and rest rooms" existed throughout the establishment. The company also supplied and laundered towels for the employees' use.

At the same time the Bancrofts introduced a number of employee benefit programs. They opened a branch of the Wilmington free library in the plant and authorized Miss Briscoe to organize sewing and cooking classes for the female employees. An emergency room and a physician "on call" for serious cases replaced the first aid

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8 For Miss Briscoe's biography see Every Evening (Wilmington, Del.), October 6, 1919.
9 Elizabeth Briscoe lecture at New York University, April 21, 1913, National Civic Federation Papers, New York Public Library, New York, Box 165.
11 Ibid., 50, 54, 86, 261.
15 Ibid.
cabinet in Miss Briscoe's office. In 1906-1907 the company built an elaborate three-story house for its single employees. Before bids were considered, Miss Briscoe obtained the names of firms in the East with outstanding versions of such structures which she might visit. While construction was in progress, she consulted social agencies and several other companies in an effort to secure a well-qualified administrator to run the boardinghouse. These efforts apparently produced good results. For three dollars per week occupants received room and board and the use of complete laundry facilities. A contemporary volume chronicling the success of welfare programs noted the house's modern living, reading and dining rooms. In 1910 these efforts reached their apogee with the construction of a swimming pool for the men.

Miss Briscoe was also successful in dealing with the workers' grievances. She registered their complaints with the management on numerous occasions and in one instance convinced the local railroad to change its schedule to accommodate the commuting employees. In a 1913 speech she described her relations with the rank and file employees. At first, she recalled, "they were suspicious and called me the 'lady detective.'" But soon the appellation had changed to "lady nurse," and she believed the majority of workers considered her their "personal friend, ready to help." With the exception of one short work stoppage in a single department in 1907, there was no apparent unrest among the employees before 1909, and certainly no efforts to organize.

The Bancrofts were highly pleased with their program and with Miss Briscoe's energetic administration. In response to a 1908 query regarding her effectiveness, they declared that they considered her "most useful and . . . practically indispensable as a point of contact between our company and its employees." In a more tangible expression of their confidence, the Board of Directors sent their welfare secretary on a European junket to give her a first-hand knowledge of welfare practices abroad. These actions make it apparent that neither John Bancroft nor the other family members intended to downgrade welfare work when they hired H. L. Catt.

Originally built for female operatives only, the structure was soon opened to men.


William Tolman, Social Engineering (New York, 1907), 242.

Operating and Advisory Committee Minutes, Bancroft Papers, Vol. 1, Acc. 736, No. 79, 106.


Elizabeth Briscoe lecture at NYU, April 31, 1913, NCP Papers, Box 105.

Tolman, Social Engineering, 57.

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Rather, their interest in Taylorism grew out of other developments seemingly unrelated to Miss Briscoe’s activities.

**INTRODUCTION OF TAYLORISM**

Undoubtedly the chief factor in the Bancrofts’ sudden conversion to Taylorism was the appearance and persistence of difficult managerial problems in the factory. With the expansion of the plant, bottlenecks had developed, particularly in the dyeing and finishing departments. Despite overtime work, the employees in these areas simply could not keep pace with the rest of the plant. While welfare work might contribute to the overall efficiency of the work force, it could hardly be expected to affect specific production problems. This pointed to the need for an outsider. But if the Bancrofts thought that Gantt and Taylorism could be confined to such limited ends, they would have been naive indeed. In fact, the situation was far more complex.

The proposal to hire Gantt came not from John nor the older Bancrofts, but from Henry Bancroft, a younger family member and minor stockholder. As early as 1902, he had corresponded with Gantt. In 1906, when Gantt was engaged at the Chester Steel Casting Company in Chester, Pennsylvania, Henry had inspected his work and had been impressed with what he saw. When problems arose in the Bancrofts’ finishing department, Henry suggested that the company employ Gantt. While none of the family members opposed Henry, their enthusiasm did not equal his. At the time, however, their interest in solving the immediate problems outweighed any reservations they might have had, and they deferred to Henry’s judgment. But this situation created a potential danger. The fact that Gantt’s principal backing came from a relatively unimportant member of the family meant that his support might be limited in the event of trouble. This was contrary to Taylor’s rule that complete management support must be forthcoming before his methods were applied.

Finally, there was an additional factor which may or may not have played a role in the Bancrofts’ thinking but which further complicated Gantt’s position. Between 1904 and 1908 Gantt had reorganized the Sayles Bleachery in Saylesville, Rhode Island, a firm whose finishing operations were similar to those of the Bancroft

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40 Gantt to Taylor, April 12, 1908, Taylor Papers, 1208.
Company. Gantt had introduced the Taylor system and devised several machines to assist in the finishing of cotton cloth. For a variety of reasons, including the great time and expense involved, his contract with Sayles was not renewed in February 1908. This job had been Gantt’s first experience with the textile industry, and a certain amount of experimentation had been necessary. But after leaving Sayles, Gantt was capable of reorganizing a firm such as the Bancroft mill with a minimum of preliminary study. The Bancrofts were apparently not oblivious to the possibility of profiting from his experience, even to the extent of introducing the devices that Gantt had invented for Sayles but had patented in his own name.

Taylor was extremely upset when he learned of Gantt’s intention to work for the Bancrofts. “This will certainly not appeal to other people if they hear about it,” he warned, noting the similarity between the Sayles and Bancroft operations. Gantt’s answer was that there was no reason to worry, for he had told the Bancrofts that he would help them only with “handling labor” and not with “processes.” This understanding may have solved the immediate problem, at least in Gantt’s mind, but it further weakened his position at Bancroft. His agreement to introduce less than the complete Taylor system also violated another of Taylor’s fundamental tenets and strained their already delicate relationship. Thus, for reasons that seemed perfectly logical beforehand, the unsuspecting Gantt soon found himself facing a difficult situation with only a limited mandate to effect his reforms.

Gantt worked intermittently at the Bancroft mills from late April 1908 to mid-May 1909. In this relatively short period he made considerable progress. This was particularly true in the pad dye works where he introduced a planning department and his task and bonus system. In his report Gantt claimed that:

- The output of the padders has been doubled;
- The cost of the work reduced;
- The wages of the men increased;
- The quality of the work improved;

Taylor to Gantt, April 13, 1908, Taylor Papers, 120 A & B; Alford, Gantt, 115.

Gantt to Taylor, April 13, 1908, Taylor Papers, 120B.

Gantt’s “innovations,” including his willingness to do what his employers desired rather than what Taylor dictated, were supposedly the major reasons for Taylor’s growing distrust of his disciple. See Alford, Gantt, 128-131; also Aiken, Taylorism, 80. But after studying twenty-four firms that introduced Taylorism between 1901 and World War I, Daniel Nelson has concluded that Gantt was, in practice, no less orthodox than Barth, Hathaway, or the other close disciples. This suggests that what he said, and especially what he wrote, rather than what he did, was the real reason for his trouble.

Gantt to John Bancroft, May 15, 1908, Taylor Papers, 121A.
The order in which work is to be done is decided now by the office, and not by the dyer;  
An exact record of the best method of dyeing any shade is kept in the office, and you are no longer dependent upon the dyer’s private note book, or his memory;  
A method of systematically educating a dyer instituted;  
A method developed for reducing the amount of dye-stuff used to a minimum.

Inasmuch as the dyer and machine runners are all benefited financially by living up to their instruction, and fail to receive the benefit where they do not do so, this condition will be permanent if it is properly looked after.

However, when he began to reorganize the girls who folded, wrapped, and ticketed the finished goods, Gantt found that his progress slowed. These sections of the plant had posed the major problems that had led to Gantt’s appointment; he found them highly congested and disorganized despite the fact that the girls frequently worked overtime. After time studies were made, the girls’ activities were completely rearranged and a new system of routing installed. Twelve girls were put on the task and bonus system and their hours were reduced from 10% to 9% per day. Output increased 25 to 30 per cent. Most of the girls earned 20 to 60 percent more than they had under weekly pay. Nevertheless Gantt’s work in these departments was the principal cause of his subsequent troubles. The workers apparently resisted his innovations from the beginning. The nature of their opposition and Gantt’s attitude toward it can best be gauged from his report to Bancroft:

It will interest you to note that some of the girls who are most regular in their attendance and efficient in their work, now, were among the very poorest workers last fall.

Last fall it was difficult to get a sufficient number of good girls for the work. Although some of the best girls have left, and others have been promoted, there is now no difficulty on that score. The readiness with which they learn to do good work when they have an example and an incentive is noteworthy, for under these conditions I have never failed to get a sufficient supply of good help.

Equally revealing was his statement regarding one of the groups and its former foreman, a man named Ryan:

One of the most serious defects of the Ryan management, and the one which has given us the most trouble to correct, was the fact that a number of the workers in the room ‘owned’ their jobs. They might stay out when

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[^8]: Ibid., 3-4; Clark and Wyett, Making Both Ends Meet, 261-63.
[^9]: Gantt to John Bancroft, May 19, 1909, Taylor Papers, 121A.
[^10]: Ibid., 5.

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they pleased, and when they came in would demand, and get, the choice
jobs as soon as they came in. The ownership of jobs has been broken up,
and a habit of regular attendance of the girls on the papering benches is
being rapidly established.

It was at this point, then, that Gantt’s work presented a direct
challenge to the traditional Bancroft approach and to Miss Briscoe’s
work. It was one thing to reorganize the dyers; it was quite another
to drive out loyal employees and create antagonism toward the
company. John Bancroft supported Gantt at first, but the other
family members began to have second thoughts about the project.

In one respect this shift was ironic, for Gantt’s original problems
had been of an entirely different nature. During the spring and
summer of 1908, Henry Bancroft had become a major obstacle.
Unlike the other Bancrofts, Henry’s enthusiasm for Gantt’s work
was unrestrained. As a result, he interfered constantly and de-
manded immediate results. On several occasions he journeyed to
Philadelphia to complain to Taylor that Gantt was moving too
slowly. Despite Taylor’s warnings that he must follow Gantt’s
instructions, Henry remained impatient. “At present he usually
has a better or shorter way than the one I suggest,” Gantt reported.
“He is thoroughly in earnest but wants results too quickly.”

But the real problem soon became apparent. Gantt later recalled
encountering resistance whenever he proposed an extension of his
work. The difficulty was “somewhere,” and he began to suspect,
correctly as events were to demonstrate, that the Bancrofts were
losing interest in his activities. Taylor related Gantt’s impressions
to another Taylorite, Carl G. Barth. John Bancroft was, he noted, a
“believer;” however, “Bancroft’s own mental attitude toward his
employees is a very difficult obstacle. He never gives anyone an
order, and with us clear-cut orders are the essence of success.”
Gantt complained that Bancroft “does not understand the principles”
of Taylorism and really wanted him to attend to only “those things
that were giving them a lot of trouble.” Edith Wyatt summarized
the problem. The workers Gantt had reorganized, she wrote, “were
in the midst of an establishment managed by another system. . .
The firm’s policy was paternalistic, and while in many ways it had
a genuine kindness, it was not in general sympathy with Scientific
Management.”

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53 Gantt to Taylor, June 1, 1908; Taylor to Gantt, May 21, 1908, Taylor Papers, 120B.
54 Taylor to Carl G. Barth, June 11, 1908, Taylor Papers, 113A; also Gantt to Taylor,
August 29, 1909, Taylor Papers, 121A.
55 Gantt to Taylor, June 29, 1909; Gantt to Taylor, August 29, 1909, Taylor Papers,
121A.
56 Clark and Wyatt, Making Both Ends Meet, 262, 264.

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The fundamental obstacle, of course, was that Gantt’s tactics seemed irreconcilable with the spirit, if not the objectives, of welfare work. His insistence on replacing the foremen and workers who, by his standards, were incompetent or failed to cooperate, was incompatible with the Bancrofts’ approach. Moreover, the conflict that developed in the departments affected by Gantt’s work, the fact that “some of the best girls have left,” struck at the heart of the welfare work philosophy of employer-employee relations. John Bancroft gradually came to the conclusion that he would have to choose between Taylorism and welfare work. Even Gantt probably realized that it was unrealistic to expect the Bancrofts to discard the company’s tradition of harmonious relations with its workers, as well as a program which seemed to be paying tangible as well as intangible returns, for an outsider’s promise of even greater returns. Finally John Bancroft called a halt. Taylorism would be limited to “those things that were giving them a lot of trouble.”

In May 1909, Gantt reported that he had temporarily ended his work at the Bancroft firm “in order that they may digest what I have already done.” 57 A month later he remained vaguely optimistic. “I am satisfied,” he wrote Taylor, “that the germ that has been implanted will go on working.” 58 In fact, his departure marked the end of Taylorism at the Bancroft mills. 59 In the following year, many of the specific measures he had introduced were modified or dropped. Some changes were the result of Henry Bancroft’s constant tampering. Gantt noted bitterly in 1910 that Henry was “gradually becoming aware of [the] . . . defects” of his meddling. 60 More serious was the tendency to cut corners, to overlook details once Gantt had left. For example, in one department girls working under the task and bonus system were required to lift heavy pieces of cloth, and several girls sustained injuries. Gantt had intended that men do the work, “but the department had never fully carried out its intention, and unfortunately since Mr. Gantt’s departure, rather more of the heavy material had been ordered . . . than before.” 61 Taylorism carelessly applied tended to confirm its critics’ fears.

57 Gantt to Taylor, May 23, 1909, Taylor Papers, 121A.
58 Gantt to Taylor, June 14, 1909, Taylor Papers, 121A.
59 This and the Sayles Bleachery job were only two of many Gantt “failures” due to worker resistance. But this problem grew out of Gantt’s interest in the purely labor aspects of Taylorism, particularly the incentive wage. Burth, who had fewer failures and less trouble with workmen, concentrated on reorganizing machinery and installing accounting systems. The machines seldom fought back.
60 Gantt to Taylor, April 9, 1910, Taylor Papers, 121A.
61 Clark and Wyatt, Making Both Ends Meet, 264-65.
CONCLUSION

Thus the contest between Taylorism and welfare work ended, to all appearances, in the victory of the latter. The Bancrofts’ indirect but seemingly effective approach had triumphed over Gantt’s more direct, systematic, and occasionally ruthless approach. And, while Gantt never returned, Miss Briscoe continued her work with considerable success. In 1910, with the Bancrofts’ support, she undertook a more thorough accident prevention program; in 1911 she became the first administrator of a formal pension plan. Retired workers would thereafter be guaranteed a weekly payment of 1 percent of their last ten years’ average wage, multiplied by their years of service.\textsuperscript{62} These events demonstrated, if the confrontation with Gantt had not, the Bancrofts’ commitment to welfare work.

In the end, however, the result was not as clear-cut as at first appeared. In 1911 the younger company executives, largely professional managers rather than family members, rebelled at continued control by the aging Bancrofts and won major concessions. Instead of family rule, an Operating and Advisory Committee was formed with John Bancroft as chairman but with control in the hands of the younger men. This upheaval apparently was unrelated to the Bancrofts’ welfare policy, but it had important effects on Miss Briscoe’s position. After 1912 she was required to report to the committee rather than to John Bancroft personally, and the scant evidence which remains suggests that her influence was substantially lessened. This indirect demotion reflected no dissatisfaction with her work; rather she suffered from too close identification with the old regime. At the same time, the Operating and Advisory Committee began to undertake the kinds of activities that Gantt might have endorsed. In 1912, for example, it engaged a New York consulting firm to introduce a modern cost accounting system.\textsuperscript{63} Other activities, consistent with the spirit, if not the letter, of Taylorism followed.\textsuperscript{64}

The process of accommodating Taylorism and welfare work, illustrated in this case by the activities of the Operating and Advisory Committee, occurred throughout American industry in the following decade. The competing doctrines, as stated and practiced

\textsuperscript{62} Operating and Advisory Committee Minutes, Vol. I, Bancroft Papers, Acc. 730, No. 79, 105.
\textsuperscript{63} Report, Miller, Frankling & Stevenson, January 17, 1912, Bancroft Papers, Acc. 730, No. 171.
\textsuperscript{64} See Operating and Advisory Committee Minutes, Vol. I, Bancroft Papers, Acc. 730, No. 79.

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by their leading proponents, had little in common. But to businessmen interested more in results than in theoretically consistent systems, the picture was not so clear. To an increasing number of employers, the differences between scientific management and welfare work, which had appeared so wide to Taylor, Gantt, and many members of the NCF, seemed less important than the potential benefits of combining the systems. During World War I elements of Taylorism were joined with welfare work to create the new field of personnel management. This new specialization attracted men who combined the "scientific" outlook of an H. L. Gantt with the humanitarian concern of a John Bancroft or an Elizabeth Briscoe and who looked back in dismay at the extreme positions taken by their predecessors.65 By 1915, certainly by 1920, the type of conflict which had occurred at Joseph Bancroft & Sons in 1908–1909 must have seemed like ancient history.

65 Good examples of the changed outlook can be found in Ordway Tead and H. Metcalf, Personnel Administration (New York, 1920), ch. 1–3; also see E. E. Hunt, ed., Scientific Management Since Taylor (New York, 1934), ch. 1. The most thorough account of the broadening of Taylorism is Haber, Efficiency and Uplift, especially ch. 1–8. Also see Milton J. Nadworny, Scientific Management and the Unions (Cambridge, Mass., 1955), ch. 7.